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I. Introduction 
Fiduciary loyalty is an increasingly rich topic of study,1 and 
many of its most interesting applications now arise in the 
corporate law setting. In part, this is a product of legal change. 
                                                                                                     
  Professor, DePaul University College of Law. I am grateful to Oren 
Bar-Gill, Christopher Bruner, Erin Delaney, Dick Fallon, Evan Fox-Decent, 
John Goldberg, Matthew Harding, Lyman Johnson, Arthur Laby, Paul Miller, 
Tim Scanlon, Henry Smith, and Deborah Tuerkheimer, as well as participants 
at a Washington & Lee Law Review Symposium, and at a workshop at the 
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, for helpful discussion of the 
ideas in this Paper. Any errors are my own. 
 1. For recent theoretical accounts of fiduciary loyalty, see Paul B. Miller, 
Dimensions of Fiduciary Loyalty, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (D. 
Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds.) (forthcoming); Stephen R. Galoob & 
Ethan J. Leib, Intentions, Compliance, and Fiduciary Obligations, 20 LEGAL 
THEORY 106 (2014); Andrew S. Gold, The Loyalties of Fiduciary Law, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 176 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. 
Miller eds., 2014) [hereinafter Gold, The Loyalties of Fiduciary Law]; Daniel 
Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post: The Non-Contractual Basis 
of Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 207 
(Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014). 
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Directors’ fiduciary obligations—and the way they are 
conceptualized—have shifted noticeably over the past twenty 
years. This change is especially evident in the area of fiduciary 
good faith, now recognized as a part of loyalty.2 In this paper, I 
will discuss an additional, less heralded strand of loyalty: loyalty 
to a corporation by advancing its purposes. 
In recent work, Lyman Johnson has powerfully captured the 
idea that legal duties of loyalty can be prescriptive, and not just 
proscriptive—and he has explained why the law should include 
both types of loyalty.3 I will address two key ideas in this work: 
first, that loyalty can involve affirmative devotion, and second, 
that loyalty can involve the pursuit of corporate purposes. Both 
ideas help us to better understand the significance of loyalty in 
fiduciary law. I will suggest, however, that these ideas do not 
interrelate in quite the way Johnson suggests. In Johnson’s view, 
when a director acts to advance a corporation’s purposes, she is 
acting to advance its best interests.4 This may not be true. In fact, 
when a director advances a corporation’s purposes, she is not 
necessarily acting to advance that corporation’s best interests, for 
she may be showing affirmative devotion in a different way. 
One can readily describe advancement of another’s purposes 
as a form of loyalty to their best interests, given that in 
individual cases the advancement of a corporation’s purposes will 
accomplish exactly that. But it is a mistake to insist that this is 
always the case. We can see why if we make a basic comparison 
to the lives of human beings. It is reasonable to think that 
sometimes people adopt aims in life that are inconsistent with 
their best interests, and it is similarly reasonable to think that 
                                                                                                     
 2. See Stone v. Ritter, 902 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). For discussion of this 
development and its connection to loyalty concepts more generally, see Andrew 
S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
457 (2009) [hereinafter Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law]. 
 3. See generally Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty 
Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (2003) [hereinafter Johnson, 
After Enron]. 
 4. See Lyman Johnson, Relating Fiduciary Duties to Corporate 
Personhood and Corporate Purpose, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 
(D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds.) (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 3) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Johnson, Relating Fiduciary Duties] (“[T]he 
directorial fiduciary duty of loyalty is to act in the best interests of the 
corporation (a distinct person) by affirmatively advancing the articulated 
corporate purpose(s).”). 
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corporations are subject to this same circumstance.5 Granting 
this point, however, the implications may be unsettling. If we 
consider it vital that directors must be loyal to the corporation, 
the idea that advancing corporate purposes can detach from best 
interests may sound like a genuine difficulty. 
Suppose that we start from the assumed premise that 
directors are acting loyally toward the corporation when they 
advance a corporation’s purposes. This is a common enough 
assumption, and in most contexts people do not imagine that 
directors who try to advance their corporation’s purposes are 
being disloyal. Once we adopt this premise—that loyalty to 
purposes is a form of loyalty to the corporation—we are faced 
with a challenge: advancing a corporation’s purposes may not be 
in the actual best interests of the corporation, and it may not 
even be in the best interests of the shareholders or any other 
evident grouping of constituencies. How are we to square loyalty 
to purposes with loyalty to the corporation, if not by thinking 
about best interests? 
The answer is to recognize that loyalty does not always 
involve the advancement of another’s best interests, even in cases 
involving affirmative devotion. There are other kinds of loyalty, 
and these alternatives are prominently visible if we look outside 
the law for guidance. There is a type of loyalty—I will refer to it 
as “purposive loyalty”—that governs the advancement of 
purposes, and it is just as important as best interests loyalty. 
This Paper will elaborate on this other kind of loyalty, and offer 
an initial account of its significance. Part II of this Paper will 
provide a brief overview of the different strands of loyalty 
recognized in corporate law. This Part will focus especially on 
loyalty as the avoidance of self-interested behavior, loyalty as 
affirmative devotion, and loyalty as being true. Part III will 
provide an overview of purposive loyalty. This Part will draw out 
both the import of purposive loyalty, and its potential divergence 
from best interests loyalty. Part IV will conclude. 
                                                                                                     
 5. And, even if we were to insist that from a legal perspective pursuit of 
another’s purposes is by definition a form of loyalty to their best interests, this 
is not the form in which loyalty to best interests is ordinarily understood outside 
the law. 
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II. Three Strands of Loyalty 
A. Loyalty as the Avoidance of Self-Interested Behavior 
Loyalty comes in many varieties, both within the law and 
outside the law.6 Sometimes loyalty overlaps with morality, 
sometimes it doesn’t—loyalty can be a socially desirable practice, 
or it can be a pernicious influence.7 The types of behavior that 
count as loyal behavior are also highly varied, with different 
types of loyalty pulling in different directions.8 We can, however, 
discern certain patterns in the types of loyalty that concern the 
courts. The classic understanding of loyalty in fiduciary settings 
is a loyalty that proscribes conduct: the loyal fiduciary must avoid 
temptation, or, in Cardozo’s language, she must show an 
abnegation of self.9 This kind of loyalty is exemplified by the rules 
addressing director conflicts of interest.10 
For some courts and scholars, the avoidance of conflicts of 
interest or conflicts of duty simply is fiduciary loyalty. That view 
is prominent in Australia—a jurisdiction in which fiduciary 
loyalty is commonly considered to be only proscriptive—and it 
has adherents elsewhere as well.11 Arguments for recognizing the 
anti-conflicts rules as the only type of loyalty are often grounded 
in an author’s views on pre-existing law: The proscriptive view is 
                                                                                                     
 6. See Johnson, After Enron, supra note 3, at 27 (2003) (indicating that 
the duties of loyalty and care carry “profound social, philosophical, and literary 
meaning outside of corporate law”). 
 7. See Andrew S. Gold, Accommodating Loyalty, in CONTRACT, STATUS, 
AND FIDUCIARY LAW 185, 188–89 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016) 
[hereinafter Gold, Accommodating Loyalty]. 
 8. See id. at 186 (describing divides among loyalty types). 
 9. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928) (“Salmon had 
put himself in a position in which thought of self was to be renounced, however 
hard the abnegation.”). 
 10. See Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, supra note 2, 
at 457 (describing conflicts of interest as the traditional area governed by the 
duty of loyalty). 
 11. For analysis of several distinct perspectives on proscriptive fiduciary 
duties in Australia, see ROSEMARY TEELE LANGFORD, DIRECTORS’ DUTIES: 
PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION 39–56 (2014). I take no stance on the correct 
interpretation of Australian law in these pages. 
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frequently an interpretive claim.12 In other cases, proponents 
may draw on policy considerations: They are concerned that if 
courts adopt broader understandings of director loyalty it will 
result in undesirable consequences.13 I will bracket these 
concerns for present purposes. Whatever the normative merits, 
there is a clear consensus that avoidance of self-interested 
conduct is a fundamental type of fiduciary loyalty. Unless 
appropriate disclosure and approval has been secured, director 
self-dealing is a classic example of disloyal behavior.14 
B. Loyalty as Advancing Best Interests 
As soon as we consider what loyalty looks like outside the 
law, the proscriptive view of loyalty begins to look strange. It 
offers a very constrained picture of what loyalty requires, much 
more constrained than we are used to seeing in non-legal 
contexts.15 On the other hand, fiduciary loyalty may also involve 
more than just the anti-conflicts rules. Drawing on George 
Fletcher’s philosophical work, Lyman Johnson has argued that 
corporate law discourse actually makes use of two different 
dimensions of loyalty: loyalty understood as a minimum condition 
for behavior, and loyalty understood as a maximum condition.16 
                                                                                                     
 12. Cf. Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Remedies, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 
570, 604–06 (2013) (“[I]t is at least widely accepted that, whatever else it may 
require, the duty of loyalty prohibits fiduciaries from acting under conflicts of 
interest.”). 
 13.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and 
Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 584–88 (2008) (discussing the expansion of the 
duty of loyalty and the policy implications for corporate governance). 
 14. See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 751 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (“The classic example that implicates the duty of loyalty is when a 
fiduciary either appears on both sides of a transaction or receives a personal 
benefit not shared by all the shareholders.”). 
 15. For some, the gap between the law and extra-legal loyalty is large 
enough to call into question whether fiduciary loyalty qualifies as a type of 
loyalty. See Stephen A. Smith, The Deed Not the Motive: Fiduciary Law Without 
Loyalty, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 213 (Paul B. Miller & 
Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016). 
 16. See Johnson, After Enron, supra note 3, at 37–42 (discussing the 
account of loyalty in GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY 
OF RELATIONSHIPS (1993)). 
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As Johnson notes, the minimum condition “requires the loyal 
actor to ‘reject temptation’ and consists of ‘not betraying the 
object of one’s loyalty.’”17 Outside the corporate sphere, this 
loyalty norm is focused on the various ways in which people may 
be self-serving, thus betraying the object of their loyalty. In 
corporate settings, the minimum condition is a match for the 
proscriptive, anti-conflicts rules of fiduciary law.18 On the other 
hand, the maximum condition for loyalty requires “an element of 
devotion.”19 There is an attachment to a specific party or cause, 
and the loyal individual shows affirmative devotion to their 
beneficiary.20 The maximum condition for loyalty is therefore not 
just proscriptive, it is prescriptive. 
Johnson argues that corporate law discourse has long 
recognized both types of loyalty.21 And, while there is some 
debate about the degree to which duties of affirmative devotion 
were historically recognized in loyalty terms, the affirmative 
devotion view is now firmly established in corporate law 
jurisprudence.22 
As developed in the in re Walt Disney Company Derivative 
Litigation23 case: 
A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, 
where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other 
than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, 
where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate positive law, 
or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a 
                                                                                                     
 17. Id. at 38 (quoting FLETCHER, supra note 16, at 40). 
 18. See id. at 39 (“Those courts and commentators emphasizing the 
necessity of personal gain or benefit as the hallmark of a loyalty breach, or the 
corresponding need to ‘refrain from’ or ‘avoid’ self-interest to fulfill the duty, are 
describing the ‘minimal condition for loyalty.’” (citations omitted)). 
 19. Id. at 38 (quoting FLETCHER, supra note 16, at 9, 24). 
 20. See Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, supra note 2, 
at 488 (“An emphasis on affirmative devotion opens up a much more extensive 
and demanding view of loyalty than corporate law has sometimes recognized.”). 
 21. See Johnson, After Enron, supra note 3, at 27 (arguing that loyalty 
includes both affirmative devotion and non-betrayal). 
 22. See id. at 40 (describing the Delaware Supreme Court’s adherence to an 
affirmative devotion conception). 
 23. 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005).  
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known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his 
duties.24 
In the subsequent decision in Stone v. Ritter,25 the Delaware 
Supreme Court clarified that this standard is a component of a 
director’s loyalty obligation.26 Affirmative devotion—understood 
in terms of advancing a beneficiary’s best interests—is thus part 
of fiduciary loyalty. 
C. Loyalty as Being True 
There is another type of loyalty that cuts across the above 
two categories, yet doesn’t necessarily belong to either of them. 
This is the type of loyalty that concerns things like honesty and 
keeping commitments. One could comply perfectly with the anti-
conflicts rules and show a thoroughgoing devotion to a 
beneficiary’s best interests while also regularly deceiving that 
beneficiary. Complete satisfaction of the first two types of loyalty 
does not guarantee that an individual is showing loyalty in all 
respects. Loyalty has multiple strands, and the overlapping types 
appear in both legal and non-legal understandings of loyal 
behavior. 
The philosopher Simon Keller has offered a helpful account of 
this third category of loyalty, in terms of a character trait.27 As he 
notes: 
There is a sense of “loyal” that is associated with being 
dependable, or reliable, or dutiful, or true—as in, “straight and 
true.” In telling you that somebody is loyal in this sense, I am 
telling you that you can trust him; he is not scheming or 
deceitful or manipulative; he will not sell you out; he takes his 
promises and commitments seriously; he knows his job and he 
gets it done.28 
This is a view of loyalty that coheres with honesty, obedience, 
keeping commitments, steadfastness. 
                                                                                                     
 24. Id. at 755; see also In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 
(Del. 2006) (endorsing the same language the chancery court used). 
 25. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 26. See id. at 370. 
 27. See SIMON KELLER, THE LIMITS OF LOYALTY 153–54 (2007). 
 28. Id. at 154. 
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Joseph Raz also assesses loyalty in terms of being true, 
although the scope of his account is arguably broader.29 Raz notes 
that some types of conduct are incompatible with certain 
relationships, and he discusses loyalty in this setting.30 As he 
then argues: “All social forms involve ways of being true to the 
project or the relationship which they define.”31 Being loyal can 
thus be understood as being true to a relationship, according to 
its terms. This picture of loyalty also has interesting features, as 
the content of such loyalty is dependent on the terms of the 
relationship at issue. 
Notice that being true in this way does not necessarily mean 
doing what will best further the aim of a relationship. One might 
actually be dreadful at advancing the relationship’s aim, while 
nonetheless acting according to its terms. In fact, one could also 
“do a lot of good as a parent, spouse, employee, music lover, etc., 
while being false to one’s pursuit or relationship.”32 And this 
brings out a notable feature of this kind of loyalty. As Raz notes: 
Indeed people have been known to betray their friends or their 
employers in the interests of those friends. Many a soap opera 
has capitalized on the idea of the lover who is disloyal in order 
to break the relationship because he realizes, correctly, that 
that is in the best interest of the loved one. Such cases may 
show that being false to one’s pursuit or relationship is, 
sometimes, justified. But even a justified betrayal is a 
betrayal.33 
As this example suggests, being true is not always the same thing 
as acting in someone’s best interests. 
Intentional failures to perform known legal duties are one 
example of a failure to be true. In the options backdating cases, 
courts have addressed this category of disloyalty when directors 
show dishonesty toward shareholders.34 It comes into play when 
                                                                                                     
 29. See generally JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986). 
 30. See id. at 353–54. 
 31. Id. at 354. 
 32. RAZ, supra note 29, at 354. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See, e.g., Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 355 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[I]t is 
difficult to conceive of a context in which a director may simultaneously lie to 
his shareholders (regarding his violations of a shareholder approved plan, no 
less), and yet satisfy his duty of loyalty.”); Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 
933 (Del. Ch. 2007) (concluding that the alleged deception discussed in Ryan “is 
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directors breach commitments they made to their shareholders. 
Arguably, a variation also shows up when directors intentionally 
violate positive law: the violation of positive law in such cases can 
be understood as a breach of the corporation’s charter, a 
commitment to shareholders that incorporates positive law 
mandates. And, in certain contexts, a director choice to encroach 
on shareholder authority may likewise qualify as a failure to be 
true.35 
One striking thing about loyalty as being true is that it can 
be violated even by directors who sincerely think they are acting 
in their corporation’s best interests. Indeed, it can be violated by 
directors who also lack any conflicts of interest; no self-dealing is 
necessary. Plainly, there are many directors who lie to their 
shareholders and do not care about helping the corporation or its 
shareholders, and this dishonest behavior frequently corresponds 
to conflicts of interests. But even in the absence of these factors, a 
director can still fail to be true. The Disney standard on fiduciary 
good faith sweeps in this category, but we should not conclude 
that it involves the same type of conduct as affirmative devotion 
in the standard sense. 
III. Purposive Loyalty 
In the Part that follows, I want to elaborate on a different 
type of prescriptive loyalty duty. This type of loyalty is shown by 
advancing someone’s purposes—and while this can be viewed as a 
form of affirmative devotion, it is also not necessarily the same 
thing as advancing someone’s best interests. Like loyalty as being 
true, this type of loyalty can detach from what is in a 
beneficiary’s best interests. 
It is possible to be loyal to an artificial person, such as a 
corporation, by respecting the purposes for which it was 
                                                                                                     
itself a disloyal act”). 
 35. I discuss each of the above examples in Andrew S. Gold, The New 
Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 472–84 (2009). 
For the relevance of loyalty as being true, see id. at 488–94. For further analysis 
of Raz’s account, see Gold, The Loyalties of Fiduciary Law, supra note 1, at 180–
81; Matthew Harding, Disgorgement of Profit and Fiduciary Loyalty, in 
EQUITABLE COMPENSATION AND DISGORGEMENT OF PROFIT (Simone Degeling & 
Jason Varuhas, eds. 2017).  
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established, as set forth in its founding documents.36 A corporate 
charter may tell us what it means for a director to advance her 
corporation’s purposes, and compliance with such charter 
provisions can be understood as a type of loyalty.37 More 
controversially, it might be possible to show this kind of loyalty 
even if such purposes are not set forth in a charter (although I 
will leave that question open for the present discussion). On the 
other hand, there is more than one way to interpret this conduct. 
What exactly makes such conduct loyal? 
Advancing corporate purposes could simply be seen as a type 
of loyalty we have already discussed: affirmative devotion, in the 
sense of advancing a beneficiary’s best interests.38 On a 
case-by-case basis, that view is surely correct. In many contexts, 
advancing a corporation’s purposes will correspond reasonably 
well with advancing its best interests.39 Suppose, however, that 
we face a fact pattern where advancing the corporation’s purposes 
will not be in the corporation’s best interests? This seems likely to 
happen under the right circumstances, and I will suggest that 
there can still be loyalty in such cases. Acting to advance a 
corporation’s stated purposes may be loyal to the corporation, 
                                                                                                     
 36. Cf. Johnson, Relating Fiduciary Duties, supra note 4 (“[C]orporations as 
distinct entities can and do have purposes separate and apart from those of its 
shareholders and other constituencies who choose, so to speak, to submit 
voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the corporation.”). 
 37. Cf. Martin Gelter & Genevieve Helleringer, Constituency Directors and 
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 
302, 319 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (“Directors to a large 
extent determine by their deliberations the corporate objective—and thus 
determine the content of the duty of loyalty—themselves.”). Note also that this 
conception of loyalty may be implicated by the view that directors who 
knowingly cause their corporation to violate the law are acting disloyally. See, 
e.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (indicating that 
directors may not act loyally “by causing the corporation to violate the laws it is 
obliged to obey”). Notably, corporate purpose clauses often incorporate a 
requirement that the corporation act lawfully. See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires 
Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with Notes on How 
Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 
1314–22 (2001) (examining evidence for understanding illegal corporate acts as 
ultra vires). For further discussion of the loyalty implications, see Gold, The New 
Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, supra note 2, at 477. 
 38.  See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text (discussing affirmative 
devotion). 
 39. Indeed, advancing the corporation’s purposes may prove to be a useful 
heuristic in that regard. 
PURPOSIVE LOYALTY 891 
even where consideration of its purposes dictates a course of 
action inconsistent with its overall best interests. 
One way that this conduct could be understood as loyal is if 
we view corporate purposes as a limit on best interests loyalty, as 
a condition on this type of loyalty’s existence. Perhaps best 
interests loyalty is sensitive to certain constraints—such as 
purposes clauses in charters—constraints that are partly 
constitutive of this loyalty. An analogous view may crop up 
outside the law, if we think that moral constraints are partly 
constitutive of the loyalty that exists between friends.40 In this 
sense, advancing corporate purposes may not coincide with 
advancing best interests, but it will qualify nonetheless as part of 
loyalty. I have in mind a different relationship between loyalty 
and corporate purposes. I will argue that the advancement of 
corporate purposes as such demonstrates a kind of loyalty, and 
that this kind of loyalty is not specifically concerned with the best 
interests of a beneficiary.41 
This poses a contrast to Johnson’s recent work. Johnson also 
sees advancement of purposes in terms of loyalty, but he adopts a 
different view on what makes this conduct loyal.42 He argues that 
when directors act to pursue the corporation’s purposes they 
simply are acting in the corporation’s best interests.43 This 
perspective suggests that acting in the best interests of a 
beneficiary and advancing that beneficiary’s purposes just are the 
                                                                                                     
 40. Cf. T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 165 (1998) 
(“Compatibility with the demands of interpersonal morality is built into the 
value of friendship itself.”). 
 41. Infra notes 72–95 and accompanying text. 
 42. See generally Johnson, Relating Fiduciary Duties, supra note 4. 
 43. See id. (manuscript at 3) (“[T]he directorial fiduciary duty of loyalty is 
to act in the best interests of the corporation (a distinct person) by affirmatively 
advancing the articulated corporate purpose(s).”); id. (manuscript at 20) (“Under 
this approach, in discharging their statutory governance responsibilities to act 
in the best interests of the corporation, directors must act to advance the 
purpose(s) of the corporation, whatever they may be.”). Arthur Laby might be 
making a similar type of argument in his account of fiduciary loyalty. See 
Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF. L. 
REV. 99, 132 (2008) (“Given the infinite number of actions available for the 
fiduciary to pursue, how does he determine what actions will benefit the 
principal? The answer is the fiduciary must become aware of the principal’s 
subjective purposes, objectives, or ends and adopt the principal’s ends as the 
fiduciary’s own ends.”).  This would depend on the extent to which purposes, 
objectives, or ends play an evidentiary role. 
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same thing. There may well be judicial opinions that adopt this 
viewpoint, and to the extent courts do so, director loyalty has 
these features. But I have doubts that this is the best perspective 
to take. Like Johnson, I think we should give careful 
consideration to how legal and extra-legal loyalty conceptions 
match up.44 With these concerns in mind, it is worthwhile to look 
more closely at the potential differences between advancing 
purposes and advancing best interests.   
For example, what does it mean if the directors of a 
corporation devoted to journalism have caused it to pursue 
neutral journalistic principles at the expense of profits? We could 
argue that this pursuit of journalistic principles is still in the 
corporation’s best interests, on the view that the corporation is 
being made to act in a manner consistent with its own 
preferences.45 Yet this requires us to imagine both that 
corporations have preferences in a way that is analogous to the 
way that humans have preferences, and also that corporations 
are better off when their preferences are met. Even if we accept 
the former claim, it is hard to say exactly how a corporation is 
better off when its preferences are met; it won’t plausibly be 
because the corporation will then experience happiness or a sense 
of satisfaction.46 
We might think that the corporation is better off in such a 
case because it is doing what it is supposed to do when it acts 
                                                                                                     
 44. See Johnson, After Enron, supra note 3, at 49 (expressing concern that 
“moral language is ill-fitting and risks debasement if used to describe persons 
who are not genuinely regarded as full-blown moral actors at all, but who are 
instrumentally conceived of as economic functionaries”); Andrew S. Gold, 
Accommodating Loyalty, supra note 7, at 192–204 (discussing the significance of 
divergence between legal and extra-legal loyalty norms).  
 45. I put to one side the contingent possibility that doing neutral 
journalism will result in greater corporate profits. That may be. The issues here, 
however, are not the ordinary business judgment rule issues concerning 
deference to business judgments that could plausibly result in benefits to the 
corporation and shareholders, but rather standard of conduct issues regarding 
what it means to act in pursuit of purposes. 
 46. Theories of well-being that focus on desire or preference satisfaction are 
also subject to some well-known challenges. See, e.g., SCANLON, supra note 40, at 
113–26 (discussing challenges for desire theories of well-being). Some of the 
complexity involves variation in the degree to which a given aim is worth 
pursuing, but it can also involve the extent to which a given aim is central to a 
person’s life. See id. at 121–22. 
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pursuant to journalistic principles—i.e., it is doing well at its 
intended purpose. This is a form of success, and success in one’s 
aims is often thought to be a component of one’s best interests.47 
Still, success in one area may mean failure in another area. If we 
are talking about overall best interests (and presumably that is 
what a director concerned with acting in a corporation’s best 
interests should care about), it is less than obvious how acting 
pursuant to a given set of principles such as neutral journalism 
will automatically advance those overall best interests. Such 
things can happen, but they seem contingent on various 
uncertain features of the world, not outcomes to be assumed.48 
In the extreme case, advancing corporate purposes means the 
corporation will cease to exist. Suppose, for example, that a board 
decides that, consistent with a corporation’s purposes, it would 
make sense to dissolve the business. Perhaps the corporation was 
founded with an aim of producing the best buggy whips in the 
market, but there no longer is a market for buggy whips (or even 
a market for the next best thing). If the board decides to dissolve 
the corporation on this basis, this seems consistent with fidelity 
to the corporation’s purposes, but it is hard to see how the 
corporation is better off as a result. It might be better off, 
arguably, if its purposes were changed so that it could profit from 
investments in a different industry. 
Notice also that, if we accept that acting in the best interests 
of a corporation means advancing its purposes, we have already 
left behind the simpler idea that best interests equates to profit 
maximization.49 Advancing a corporation’s purposes is not 
inevitably the same thing as profit maximization; while corporate 
                                                                                                     
 47. See id. at 118 (noting that “success in one’s aims, at least insofar as 
these are rational, is one of the things that contribute to the quality of a life, 
viewed from a purely personal perspective”).  
 48. Cf. id. at 121 (“But it does not seem that a person’s well-being is in fact 
always increased by increasing the number of desires or even aims that he or 
she fulfills.”); JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT AND 
MORAL IMPORTANCE 10 (1986) (“It is depressingly common that when even some 
of our strongest and most central desires are fulfilled, we are no better, even 
worse, off.”). 
 49. See Eric Rasmusen, The Goals of the Corporation Under Shareholder 
Primacy: Just Profit—or Social Responsibility and Religious Exercise Too? (Jan. 
12, 2014) (unpublished manuscript at 1), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2365135 (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review), for discussion of a broader 
notion of best interests in the corporate setting. 
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purposes are characteristically quite similar, they can vary 
considerably in individual cases.50 Assuming that advancing best 
interests and advancing purposes must coincide means that 
advancing best interests will have a content that varies with the 
purposes at issue. But once we are open to multiple 
understandings of best interests, why adopt the view that these 
two phenomena must coincide? Best interests can refer to many 
things, and if we are to understand what it means to act in the 
corporation’s best interests, we must make an inquiry into 
broader notions of what “best interests” really are. 
Let’s start with an inquiry into the meaning of best interests, 
and then turn to conceptions of loyalty. As I will suggest below, 
advancing best interests is plausibly seen as different from 
advancing purposes, or at least it is under the right 
circumstances. Once we recognize this, we can more easily see 
what is at stake if loyalty involves advancement of purposes. 
A. Human Well-Being 
If “best interests” does mean something broader than profit 
maximization, what does it refer to? For these purposes, it may 
be helpful to compare contexts involving human beings rather 
than corporations. To the extent “best interests” is not just a legal 
term of art, intuitions on what the phrase means are likely to 
draw on notions of acting in a person’s best interests, as they 
exist outside the legal sphere. Unfortunately, this is also a quite 
difficult area on which to reach consensus. When we talk about 
advancing best interests in the setting of individual lives, 
presumably we have in mind something like overall well-being—
but overall well-being is both complex and contested. 
Broadly speaking, theories of well-being tend to divide into 
three basic types: experiential theories, desire theories, and 
substantive-good theories.51 We can focus on how a person 
                                                                                                     
 50. Cf. id. at 7 (“One cannot look to a corporation’s charter to discover 
whether it is intended to maximize profits. The main specification in a charter is 
the corporation’s ‘purpose’—the activities in which it can engage—rather than 
its ‘goal’ . . . .”). 
 51. This is Scanlon’s division. See SCANLON, supra note 40, at 113 
(providing an analysis on the purpose of the division). For another well-known 
division, albeit relatively similar in content, see DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND 
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experiences her life, for example whether she is happy; we can 
focus on whether she has been able to satisfy her preferences, 
whatever those may be; or, we can focus on whether her life 
measures up well against some good or group of goods that is 
considered valuable. And, quite possibly, overall well-being 
involves some combination of success in each of these areas, and 
the key question is the difficult question of how to weight the 
different components.52 Each individual theory has its proponents 
and detractors. 
There are ways to put pressure on experiential theories. For 
example, if Jane’s friends don’t really care for her, but she never 
finds out about it, is she just as well off as she would be in the 
case where her friends did care for her?53 Many of us would say 
that she has a lower level of well-being, but if so it isn’t due to her 
experiential differences.54 Or, what if, like Freud, one chooses to 
experience chronic pain by foregoing pain-killing drugs—for the 
sake of mental clarity?55 We might find some measure along 
                                                                                                     
PERSONS 4 (1984) (suggesting a Hedonistic Theory, a Desire-Fulfilment Theory, 
and an Objective List Theory).  Scanlon offers reasons for preferring his division 
of categories at T.M. Scanlon, Value, Desire, and Quality of Life, in THE 
DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 169, 173 (2003). 
 52. See SCANLON, supra note 40, at 125 (questioning whether “we will find 
a general theory telling us how much weight to assign to the different elements 
of well-being I have listed”). 
 53. See id. at 112  
[I]t makes sense to say that the life of a person who is happy only 
because he does not know that the people whom he regards as 
devoted friends are in fact artful deceivers is worse, for the person 
who lives it, than a similar life in which the person is made happy by 
true friends.  
See also GRIFFIN, supra note 48, at 13 (“Or if a father wants his children to be 
happy, what he wants, what is valuable to him, is a state of the world, not a 
state of his mind . . . .”); id. at 9 (describing a preference for the bitter truth over 
“consummate actors able to give me sweet simulacra of love and affection”). I am 
bracketing the difficulty in applying this view to corporations, given that they do 
not experience happiness or other emotions, or for that matter pain and 
pleasure.  
 54. There is also the possibility that different pleasures merit different 
weights. For a famous example of this view, see JOHN STUART MILL, 
UTILITARIANISM, ch. 2 (Roger Crisp ed. 1998) (distinguishing higher and lower 
pleasures); see also GRIFFIN, supra note 48, at 38 (linking Mill’s views to an 
informed desire theory). 
 55. This example has been used to call into question experiential theories. 
See GRIFFIN, supra note 48, at 8 (“But can we find a single feeling or mental 
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which Freud’s experiences are desirable, but it seems that well-
being doesn’t always equate to an increase in pleasant 
experiences. Then again, perhaps some cases are even more 
difficult. Consider Sisyphus, pushing a boulder up a hill for all 
eternity. This is usually considered a punishment, but imagine 
that Sisyphus actually likes the task and finds it fulfilling. As 
Susan Wolf suggests, better to be Sisyphus happy than Sisyphus 
unhappy.56 On the other hand, as she also adds, “better still not 
to be Sisyphus at all”.57 If we share in Wolf’s intuition, this 
suggests that well-being may involve something more than 
experiential factors. 
This is not to downplay the importance of experiential 
theories for our understanding of well-being. Even if we are not 
drawn to experiential theories as a complete answer, it is hard to 
deny that experiences like happiness or pleasure have bearing on 
someone’s well-being. All else equal, happiness is usually 
considered to add to well-being—and it is the rare theorist who 
would deny this. The challenges arise when we adopt an 
experiential theory of well-being to the exclusion of other factors 
that plausibly also bear on the question. An experiential theory 
alone produces counterintuitive results for many people.58 
Desire theories focus on the extent to which an individual’s 
desires have been met. These theories face a different set of 
challenges, including criteria for the desires that should matter.59 
For one thing, there is great difficulty in assessing how to weigh 
different desires.60 Some desires, such as those associated with 
                                                                                                     
state in both of Freud’s options in virtue of which he ranked them as he did?”). 
 56. See Susan Wolf, Happiness and Meaning: Two Aspects of the Good Life, 
in THE VARIETY OF VALUES: ESSAYS ON MORALITY, MEANING, & LOVE 107, 121 
(2015). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See SCANLON, supra note 40, at 113. 
 59. In order to avoid counterintuitive results, a common limit suggests that 
we should care about those desires that concern our own lives. See PARFIT, supra 
note 51, at 494 
Suppose that I meet a stranger who has what I believe to be a fatal 
disease. My sympathy is aroused, and I strongly want this stranger to 
be cured. We never meet again. Later, unknown to me, this stranger 
is cured. On the Unrestricted Desire-Fulfillment Theory, this event is 
good for me, and makes my life go better. This is not plausible. 
 60. Infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
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comprehensive goals or aims in life, seem to merit a great deal of 
weight.61 Yet attaining one’s comprehensive goals is occasionally 
going to mean that one fails to satisfy many less overarching 
goals.62 For example, someone whose life goal is to be a world-
famous scientist may not be able to focus enough on other, small-
scale goals sufficiently to attain those other goals.63 There are 
also questions concerning the exact type of desires that should 
matter. Should we focus on desires as they actually exist? Or, 
rather, on someone’s informed desires, those desires they would 
have if they knew more?64 This question does not have an obvious 
(or uncontroversial) answer, and our responses may depend at 
least partly on which desires are at issue. 
Substantive-good theories incorporate experiential theories 
as a subset, but they can also extend to goods that are not solely 
appreciated in terms of experiential factors, such as their 
happiness- or pleasure-producing qualities. Likewise, they need 
not be determined by an individual’s success in achieving her 
                                                                                                     
 61. On comprehensive goals, see RAZ, supra note 29, at 293. On their 
weight for purposes of assessing well-being, see SCANLON, supra note 40, at 122. 
Yet there is a complication in these cases when comprehensive goals change, for 
it is not always clear which goal or goals should be central. See GRIFFIN, supra 
note 48, at 16 (“Suppose that for much of his life a person wanted his friends to 
keep him from vegetating when he retired, but, now that he is retired, wants to 
be left to vegetate.”). Corporations, of course, are subject to a similar question 
when corporate goals change or are under consideration for change. 
 62.  The significance of quantities is also not obvious here. One challenge is 
that having a greater sum total of preferences met—simply because, say, one 
desires a larger number of things—does not obviously equate to having a greater 
level of well-being than the well-being possessed by someone who has a smaller 
number of preferences. SCANLON, supra note 40, at 121. 
 63. Note also that someone who has had great success in meeting her 
preferences may turn out to be miserable as a consequence. I discuss this 
problem below in connection with substantive good theories. See infra notes 65–
69 and accompanying text. 
 64. For a discussion on informed desire approaches, see SCANLON, supra 
note 40, at 114–15. As Scanlon notes, a challenge here is that informed desires 
may not always be connected to the quality of life of the person who holds them. 
Id. at 115. There is also an apparent shift from satisfaction of desires as the 
basis for well-being, toward reasons for desirability as the basis for well-being. 
See id. (“What makes it the case that I have reason to learn French is the 
enjoyment and other benefits I would gain from being able to speak it, not the 
desire that full awareness of these benefits would generate.”). A further shift to 
rational aims offers responses to some of these concerns, but it still faces 
challenges. Id. at 120–21. 
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desires, preferences, or goals. As Tim Scanlon notes: “Many goods 
that contribute to a person’s well-being depend on the person’s 
aims but go beyond the good of success in achieving those aims. 
These include such things as friendship, other valuable personal 
relations, and the achievement of various forms of excellence, 
such as in art or science.”65 Likewise, Susan Wolf suggests that a 
life may be better when it possesses connections to “value outside 
ourselves.”66 This type of view separates well-being, at least in 
part, from questions that can be purely boiled down to 
experiential goods or to preference-based reasoning.67 
Substantive-good theories that take a broad perspective on 
what counts as a good may lead to counter-intuitive results in 
some cases. After all, there is a potential for tension between 
certain substantive goods and the level of happiness or preference 
satisfaction that an individual achieves, and it is difficult for 
most of us to view happiness or preference satisfaction as 
completely irrelevant in such cases. Suppose that someone is able 
to act morally with great success—perhaps making large 
sacrifices for others in the process—but that he is nonetheless 
both unhappy and unable to satisfy the vast majority of his 
preferences on a day-to-day basis. Or imagine an individual is 
able to do something deeply meaningful in her life, but the result 
is a life of hardship and misery.68 How should we assess 
well-being in these cases? This problem, moreover, can become 
even more challenging if an individual’s projects in life shift over 
time, as sometimes happens.69 
                                                                                                     
 65. Id. at 125. 
 66. See Wolf, supra note 56, at 123 (noting, however, that it is difficult to 
determine “[w]hat precisely is better”). For her arguments distinguishing 
preference-based theories and experiential theories from an account that focuses 
on the meaningful, see id. at 120–23. Cf. GRIFFIN, supra note 48, at 19 (“If I 
want to accomplish something with my life, it is not that I want to have a sense 
of accomplishment.”). 
 67. See WOLF, supra note 56, at 123 (proposing that we live “in a world full 
of value independent of ourselves”). 
 68. See SUSAN WOLF, MEANING IN LIFE AND WHY IT MATTERS 14 (2010) 
[hereinafter WOLF, MEANING IN LIFE] (“[S]omeone whose life is fulfilling has no 
guarantee of being happy in the conventional sense of that term. Many of the 
things that grip or engage us make us vulnerable to pain, disappointment, and 
stress.”).   
 69. Cf. GRIFFIN, supra note 48, at 16 (noting that “preferences change, and 
not always in a way that allows us totally to discount earlier ones.”). 
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I will not seek to resolve the various debates about well-being 
in these pages, and the important details of these debates extend 
well beyond what is mentioned here. The above discussion is 
intended merely to sketch some of the relevant terrain, and to 
make clear that attending to someone’s best interests is not easily 
reducible to a simple formula. It is also indicative of the difficulty 
in claiming that advancement of someone’s purposes amounts to 
the same thing as advancement of their best interests. 
When dealing with human beings, it is not at all evident that 
advancing their purposes in life will mean that one has advanced 
their overall well-being. Success at one’s comprehensive goals 
may tend to coincide with greater happiness, or fulfillment, or 
perhaps preference satisfaction. But not in all cases, and if an 
individual does poorly enough in those other categories we may 
doubt that they have a high level of well-being. Likewise, if their 
comprehensive goals are dubious (or subject to change), 
advancing those goals may be a questionable way of advancing 
their overall well-being even if it leads to some happiness.70 There 
is nonetheless a potentially important link between well-being 
and an individual’s comprehensive goals in life, between their 
well-being and their purposes.71 Indeed, perhaps advancing 
someone’s comprehensive goals is at least an integral part of 
acting in their best interests. This brings us to the topic of 
loyalty. 
B. The Place for Purposive Loyalty 
As the above discussion suggests, there is at least room to 
debate whether advancing a human being’s purposes will 
advance their overall well-being. Why think, then, that advancing 
a corporation’s purposes will always equate to advancing a 
corporation’s best interests? Corporations are, of course, a whole 
different question. I am unsure how to fully transpose the above 
                                                                                                     
 70. Cf. WOLF, supra note 56, at 111–12 (discussing examples of people 
engaged in the pursuit of questionable life goals). 
 71. For example, it may be impossible to determine what will advance 
someone’s overall well-being without knowing their aims in life. See SCANLON, 
supra note 40, at 131 (“Well-being becomes much more determinate only once 
our central aims are chosen.”). 
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concerns from the human setting to the corporate setting.72 
Arguably there are corporate analogues in some cases (for 
example, corporate preferences might be satisfied to a greater or 
lesser degree), but the life of a corporation is not 
straightforwardly assessed in the same way as the life of a 
human being. Acting in a corporation’s best interests, if it means 
anything outside the law, likely means something different from 
acting in a human being’s best interests. Whatever the right 
answer may be, however, to claim that advancing purposes is the 
same thing as advancing best interests is not a simple matter of 
applying the idea of best interests as it exists extra-legally, in the 
interpersonal context. 
With this in mind, it may be worth considering another 
possibility. As far as loyalty goes, do we even need to think in 
terms of a corporation’s best interests when we talk about 
advancing a corporation’s purposes? Arguably not. Admittedly, 
loyalty commonly involves the advancement of someone’s best 
interests, and the salience of this conception might motivate us to 
seek linkages between best interests and purposes. It is 
unsurprising that a best interests conception of loyalty may be 
the first place we turn. Yet there is also another possibility: there 
is a distinct conception of loyalty that concerns advancement of a 
beneficiary’s purposes, tout court. This subpart will elaborate on 
this conception of loyalty, and offer illustrations in support. 
Notice, first, that best interests loyalty is not the only type of 
loyalty that is recognized in the law, or outside of it. Loyalty is 
frequently shown in cases where the loyal behavior at issue 
involves obedience to commands, instructions, or requests.73 This 
category cannot be the same as best interests loyalty, given that 
beneficiaries frequently instruct loyal parties to engage in 
                                                                                                     
 72. Query also whether it should matter if a corporation’s chosen goals are, 
while legal, nonetheless execrable. 
 73. See KELLER, supra note 27, at vii (“If you are loyal to something, then 
you probably favor it, in one way or another, in actions. You might promote its 
interests, treat it with respect or veneration, follow its orders, or act as its 
advocate.”); Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 513, 559 (2015) (noting that following instructions “may be 
described as an element of loyalty”). Requests are less frequently noted in 
analyses of loyalty, but following a request is another example. Cf. DAVID 
OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE 99–100 (2012) (indicating that a 
friend’s request may create an obligation). 
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conduct that is not in their best interests, and given that the 
loyalty mandate in such cases is not limited to cases in which 
good outcomes are likely. Nor is following instructions just a 
heuristic for advancing best interests. In fact, outside of the law 
the kind of loyalty that involves following instructions tends to 
require a distinct kind of motivation: a principal could rightly be 
concerned if her agent said she is only following her instructions 
because the agent thought this would work out best for the 
principal. That would sound like a very unstable basis for loyalty, 
and the principal could rightly say that this isn’t the kind of 
loyalty she requires.74 
But purposive loyalty does not look quite the same as 
instruction-following loyalty. When a loyal party seeks to act in 
ways that advance the purposes of her principal, this need not be 
because of anything the principal (or a third party) has 
commanded.75 The loyal party need not be acting out of obedience 
to an order. This, however, raises a question: If purposive loyalty 
is neither best interests loyalty nor instruction-following loyalty, 
what is it? 
Such purposive loyalty has an analogue outside the legal 
sphere. Unlike corporations, natural persons do not have charters 
that specify their purposes. But they may very well develop a 
clear and deeply meaningful set of purposes over time, and these 
purposes can inform our understanding of what it means to be 
loyal to them. During the course of their lives, individuals acquire 
                                                                                                     
 74.  Within the law, the relation between a duty to follow instructions and 
a duty to be loyal is an interesting one. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, 
§ 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the 
principal's benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship.”); 
Deborah A. DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency and the Interpretation of 
Instructions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 321, 321 
(Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (“The agent’s fiduciary duty to the 
principal furnishes a benchmark for interpretation and for assessing actions the 
agent takes in response.”). 
 75.  This conduct also need not qualify as loyalty to a determinate 
beneficiary (and thus, not all loyalty that involves advancement of purposes 
involves the same phenomena as the loyalty described in this paper).  See Miller 
& Gold, supra note 73, at 562 (“Loyalty, however, need not be directed toward 
persons. It may instead be directed toward abstract purposes that transcend the 
interests of determinate persons.”). The purposive loyalty described here does 
involve loyalty to a determinate beneficiary. 
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ground projects that give their lives meaning.76 As Bernard 
Williams notes, a person may thus be “identified with his actions 
as flowing from projects and attitudes which in some cases he 
takes seriously at the deepest level, as what his life is about.”77 
Loyalty may be concerned with advancement of these ground 
projects, and if so it takes on a distinctive cast.78 
A loyal friend or family member may take advancement of 
purposesas reflected in a person’s ground projectsas a means 
to be loyal to that person, even where they fear that pursuit of 
these purposes will not advance (or might impair) her 
objectively-construed best interests. And, just as instruction-
following loyalty can involve a thoroughgoing devotion to a 
beneficiary, so too with purposive loyalty. Indeed, purposive 
loyalty may actually supersede other types of loyalty: this is not 
an inferior or second-best loyalty, but rather a different category 
of loyalty that has its own merits. It is, in some cases, a type of 
loyalty that reflects a profound caring about the beneficiary. 
For example, suppose that Jack is good friends with Jill. Jill 
has always wanted to become a novelist and, over time, this 
pursuit has become a ground project for her. The goal of becoming 
a novelist is something that gives Jill’s life meaning, and from 
her perspective, purpose. She has ordered her career, 
educational, financial, and other significant matters accordingly. 
                                                                                                     
76.  For seminal accounts of ground projects and their role, see generally 
J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR & AGAINST (1983); 
Bernard Williams, Persons, Character and Morality, in MORAL LUCK 1, 13–14 
(1981). As Susan Wolf has noted, the term “projects” may be less than ideal. See 
Susan Wolf, The Meanings of Lives, in THE VARIETY OF VALUES: ESSAYS ON 
MORALITY, MEANING, & LOVE 89, 94 (2015) (“[T]he use of the word ‘project’ is not 
ideal: It is too suggestive of a finite, determinate task, something one takes on 
and, if all goes well, completes.”). For example, there are cases where what we 
really have in mind are relationships. See id. (“Relationships, in particular, 
seem at best awkwardly described as projects.”). This concern seems especially 
apt when we are worried about questions of loyalty. Like Wolf, I will read the 
term “projects” broadly for purposes of the present argument, so as to include 
things like relationships. 
 77. SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 76, at 116. 
 78. While efforts to advance ground projects may comprise a subset of what 
Arthur Laby describes as the pursuit of a principal’s ends, it appears that many 
of the ends Laby has in mind are less foundational to a beneficiary’s life. Cf. 
Laby, supra note 43, at 135 (referring to the responsibility of a fiduciary to 
appropriate the “objectives, goals, or ends of another”). 
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Jack, out of loyalty to Jill, might ordinarily seek to act in her best 
interests. But suppose he realizes that there is an opportunity to 
assist Jill in becoming a novelist. Let’s say that Jack is unconvinced 
that being a novelist is in Jill’s best interests (it probably won’t pay 
well, he anticipates she will find the lifestyle stressful, and he is not 
even convinced she would find it fulfilling). Jack hopes and expects 
she will change her mind eventually. Out of loyalty, he might 
nevertheless attempt to help Jill achieve her purposes as she 
understands and values them.79 This form of loyalty is not 
concerned so much with what is best for someone as with what they 
wish to be in life.80 
It may be helpful to compare Tim Scanlon’s work in moral 
philosophy, as it captures some of the key insights. Scanlon notes 
that there are people who, due to their interpersonal relationships, 
are benefactors for others.81 And, as he notes, a benefactor “has 
reason to do what will benefit his or her intended beneficiary and to 
do it because that person will benefit.”82 Examples include friends 
and parents. In many cases, what the beneficiary wants is actually 
to help someone else.83 In such cases, a benefactor who helps the 
beneficiary to help others will nonetheless be acting with the aim of 
benefitting the beneficiary: “If my benefactor saves my child or my 
parents, or restores some buildings in my city, and does this qua 
benefactor, that is to say, for me, he is doing it because he sees this 
as benefitting me in some way, or at least because I want it.”84 Many 
cases of loyalty have this quality, in that a loyal party is motivated 
by the principal’s best interests or preferences even though the 
principal’s own reasons for desiring assistance are altruistic. 
                                                                                                     
 79.  Cf. SIMON KELLER, PARTIALITY 144 (2013) (“When you act for the sake 
of a person, you can think of yourself as doing something that is valuable from 
her point of view.”). 
 80. Indeed, it is a characteristic of seeking fulfillment that the process and 
end result may be different from what makes that individual happy. See WOLF, 
MEANING IN LIFE, supra note 68, at 14 (“[S]omeone whose life is fulfilling has no 
guarantee of being happy in the conventional sense of that term. Many of the 
things that grip or engage us make us vulnerable to pain, disappointment, and 
stress.”). 
 81. See SCANLON, supra note 40, at 134–35 (discussing friends and family 
members as benefactors). 
 82. Id. at 134. 
 83. See id. at 134–35 (discussing such cases). 
 84. Id.  
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Yet, in some cases, something more may be going on. As 
Scanlon points out: “It is not always clear that someone who stands 
in one of these relations to us therefore has reason to do what will 
‘make our life go better,’ as opposed to reason to help us to do what 
we have reason to want to do, whether or not this will conduce to 
our well-being.”85 This possibility makes room for a purposive 
loyalty that differs from best interests loyalty. Consider Scanlon’s 
illustration: 
Suppose, for example, that I have good reason to want to pursue 
a career as an artist, or as a labor organizer, even though this 
may lead to a lower level of well-being for me overall because of 
the difficulty and discomfort that this life involves. Suppose also 
that I cannot do this without help from some friends or family 
members. Do they have reason to help me even though they are 
not thereby promoting my well-being? It seems to me that they 
may.86 
This suggestion seems exactly right; benefactors may well have 
reason to advance someone’s comprehensive goals, whether or not 
that is going to promote their well-being. All we need to add is that 
these reasons can also qualify as reasons of loyalty.87  
Some readers might focus on the possibility of success 
presented by the above example: being an artist or a labor union 
organizer can lead to fulfillment and happiness, and the parents or 
friends in the above fact pattern may pin their hopes on this. 
Perhaps that is so, but not necessarily. In any event, we can make 
the example more extreme, to avoid too much overlap with a 
happiness-based or otherwise hedonistic picture of the intended 
outcome. Consider the case of Owen Wingrave, a character from the 
work of Henry James.88 As Bernard Williams describes his story: 
                                                                                                     
 85. Id. at 135. 
 86. Id. at 135. 
 87.  Notice also that friends and parents may have reason to help in this 
example even if they are not requested or instructed to do so. Accordingly, this 
type of loyalty can fall outside of loyalty as obedience (and, potentially, loyalty 
as being true). This depends, however, on how broadly we construe loyalty as 
being true. If it means being true to the terms of a relationship, then loyalty as 
being true is so capacious that it will likely incorporate all categories of loyalty. 
If instead being true means being honest, keeping commitments one has made, 
and similar behavior of that nature then it may involve something different 
from purposive loyalty. 
 88.  See generally HENRY JAMES, OWEN WINGRAVE (Cullen Press 2016) (1893). 
As I have not yet had the benefit of reading the Henry James story, this account is 
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Owen’s family urge on him the necessity and importance of his 
joining the army, since all his male ancestors were soldiers, and 
family pride requires him to do to the same. Owen Wingrave has 
no motivation to join the army at all, and all his desires lead in 
another direction: he hates everything about military life and 
what it means.89 
This is not, then, a career choice about which Owen is idealistic, at 
least not with respect to his dreams about what he will do with his 
career. 
We can imagine, however, that further discussion with his 
family has convinced Owen to make this choice regardless. As 
Williams puts it: “Owen Wingrave might come to join the army 
because (now) he believes that it is a reason for him to do so that his 
family has a tradition of military honour.”90 Owen, let us assume, 
holds out no hope that this will make him happy or lead to a 
fulfilling life; he simply thinks it is the right thing for him to do 
given the family tradition, and he genuinely cares about making the 
sacrifice. In such a case, a benefactor could plausibly assist Owen, 
despite being quite convinced (as Owen himself is) that this will not 
lead to happiness or fulfillment even if Owen is successful as a 
soldier. Granted, assisting Owen could advance what is meaningful 
to him (and this could have some bearing on his well-being on some 
theories),91 but it is difficult to see this case in terms of what will 
advance Owen’s overall best interests.92 The Owen Wingrave case 
nonetheless involves a form of loyalty.93 
                                                                                                     
reliant on Bernard Williams’s summary of the plot. Williams, supra note 76, at 
106. 
 89.  Williams, supra note 76, at 106.  
 90.  Id. at 107. 
 91.  Cf. WOLF, supra note 56, at 122–23 (discussing connections between 
meaningfulness and well-being).  
 92.  This example also underscores a further consideration. To the extent 
success in an individual’s comprehensive goals is linked to that individual’s 
well-being, it is often thought that those goals must be valuable goals. See RAZ, 
supra note 29, at 298 (contending that “a person’s well-being depends on the value 
of his goals and pursuits”). If one adopts that perspective, advancement of goals 
will only sometimes involve advancement of well-being. Yet loyalty could involve 
advancing someone’s comprehensive goals even when those goals are not valuable. 
A striking feature of loyalty is that it does not always match well with moral 
obligations, and in such a case loyalty obligations may diverge from the 
requirements of morality. 
 93.  Note also that a loyal party might be concerned with helping someone 
have a life that is choiceworthy, even if this does not involve advancement of their 
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The strand of loyalty involved in advancing someone’s purposes 
(or aims) is not reducible to any of the conventional strands of 
fiduciary loyalty, although as a contingent matter it can overlap 
with them. If we look at what loyalty means outside the law, there 
are ways to show devotion to someone that detach from their best 
interests, for example by following their instructions. Acting to 
advance someone’s purposes in life is another possibility, and in 
some settings it is an especially important one. 
Adapted to the corporate setting, a director may show loyalty to 
her corporation by advancing the purposes for its existence, and she 
need not conclude in doing so that she is advancing its best 
interests. This perspective, moreover, allows us to square loyalty to 
a corporation with a decision to vote in favor of dissolving that 
corporation when its purposes are no longer viable.94 A similar point 
applies for partners that terminate a partnership when its planned 
undertaking is completed.95 Advancing a corporation’s purposes can 
be a way of advancing its best interests, but under the right 
circumstances it involves significant stretching to reach that 
conclusion. We should not therefore conclude that a loyalty 
framework is unavailable. There is, fortunately, another way to 
understand loyalty to a corporation in these settings. 
                                                                                                     
well-being. In some cases, people sacrifice their well-being for others, and this may 
mean that their life is choiceworthy when viewed from a certain perspective. Even 
if this does not match the Owen Wingrave fact pattern, it could readily match 
other fact patterns in which people sacrifice their interests for others, or for aims 
that they care about. Cf. SCANLON, supra note 40, at 112 (“We might say, for 
example, that there is reason to choose a certain life because of its great value, 
even though it involves a low level of well-being . . . .”); see also id. at 131 
(discussing how a life could be more choiceworthy “because it offered the only way 
of fulfilling an obligation to care for a relative”). 
 94.  Cf. WOLF, supra note 68, at 56 (“What gives meaning to our lives gives 
us reasons to live even when the prospects of our well-being are bleak. Indeed, 
what gives meaning to our lives may give us reasons beyond that. As Camus 
pointed out, if something is worth living for, it is also worth dying for.”).  
 95.  I do not pursue it here, but a similar set of issues might be raised in 
cases where directors wish to change a corporation’s purposes. In that case, they 
might be advancing a corporation’s higher-order preferences (or purposes), and 
this also raises interesting questions whether an amendment to purposes is, as 
such, an example of loyalty to a corporation’s best interests. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Fiduciary loyalty includes a range of obligations. Classically, 
it incorporates the anti-conflict rules, but it also calls for the loyal 
party to act in the best interests of her beneficiary. Furthermore, 
recent case law has recognized a distinctive element of loyalty: 
the requirement of being true. Loyalty in the sense of being true 
calls for honesty and a keeping of commitments. Interestingly, 
when directors act to advance the purposes of their corporation, 
they may be demonstrating a type of loyalty that fits into none of 
the above categories. They may be engaging in purposive loyalty, 
and that has its own distinctive meaning. 
Purposive loyalty is the kind of loyalty that parents engage 
in when they seek to advance their daughter’s career goals, 
despite a belief that her chosen career will not lead to happiness, 
or ultimately be in her best interests. It is the loyalty that friends 
show when they assist each other despite being convinced that 
they are helping their friend pursue a mistaken path. Of course, 
in many of these cases, the loyal party will think that they are 
helping the beneficiary advance her best interests, or at least 
they may be unsure of what her best interests entail. The 
relevant point is that this purposive loyalty shows a genuine 
devotion irrespective of whether the conduct at issue is thought to 
advance best interests, and irrespective of whether the loyal 
conduct was even requested by the beneficiary. Purposive loyalty 
is its own category of loyalty. 
The realization that best interests are not always at issue 
when people are loyal might seem surprising. Yet we should not 
be surprised that there are types of loyalty that diverge from 
advancing someone’s best interests. Obediently following 
instructions is a way of being loyal, and following instructions 
diverges from a principal’s best interests with embarrassing 
frequency. This same point applies to other loyalty obligations, 
including fiduciary obligations. Just as avoiding conflicts of 
interest does not inevitably mean that one acts in another’s best 
interests, and likewise just as telling the truth does not 
inevitably mean that one acts in another’s best interests, by the 
same token advancing someone’s purposes may not equate to 
acting in their best interests. 
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There are those who argue that advancing a corporation’s 
purposes simply is the same thing as advancing the corporation’s 
best interests. I suspect one reason why we sometimes see best 
interests loyalty identified with an advancement of purposes is 
due to a fear that, if these two types of conduct diverged, it would 
be harder to justify the advancement of corporate purposes. That 
is, it might be harder to describe this conduct in loyalty terms. 
This Paper suggests that this fear, if it exists, is overblown. 
Purposive loyalty is a genuine way of being loyal—indeed, it 
involves a very substantial type of devotion—and there is no 
reason to think that it can not apply to directors when they seek 
to advance their corporation’s purposes. And, by thinking in this 
way, we do not have to engage in any awkward bending of the 
facts to locate a beneficiary’s best interests. Loyalty often has 
other concerns in mind. 
